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BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND 
THE EU LEGAL ORDER: IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE LISBON TREATY 
INTRODUCTION 
oreign direct investment (“FDI”)1 is the “lifeblood of the global 
economy.”2 Foreign investors of developed, capital-exporting 
countries pursue opportunities abroad in efforts to obtain the highest re-
turns on their investments, as well as to solidify positions in emerging 
markets.3 Meanwhile, developing, capital-importing countries seek to 
attract capital flows and new technologies in efforts to enhance their 
economies and improve their competitive standing in the global market-
place.4 In recent decades FDI flows dramatically surged,5 a trend that is 
                                                                                                             
 1. The International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development define direct “foreign investment” as cross-border invest-
ment made by a resident entity in one economy (the “direct investor” or “multinational 
enterprise”) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in 
an economy other than that of the direct investor (the “foreign affiliate”). See Internation-
al Monetary Fund [IMF], Balance of Payments Manual, at 86, (5th ed. 1993); see also 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Detailed Bench-
mark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, at 7–8, (3d ed. 1996). 
 2. See Bernardo M. Cremades & David J. A. Cairns, Contract and Treaty Claims 
and Choice of Forum in Foreign Investment Disputes, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 325, 325 (Norbert Horn & Stefan Kroll, eds., 2004); see also Karl 
P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT 
FLOWS lx (2009) (stating that “[o]ne uncontroversial truth is that virtually all countries 
value FDI as a means to advance their economic development” and thus “compete with 
each other to attract investment”). 
 3. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment Report 
2003: FDI Policies for Development; National and International Perspectives, xv, U.N. 
Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2003 (Sept. 4, 2003) (stating that “intense competition continues to 
force [transnational corporations] to invest in new markets and to seek access to low-cost 
resources and factors of production”). 
 4. See id. at iii (stating that due to its “enormous potential to create jobs, raise prod-
uctivity, enhance exports and transfer technology, foreign direct investment is a vital 
factor in the long-term economic development of the world’s developing countries”). 
 5. See MIRIAN KENE OMALU, NAFTA AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH, IMPLEMENTATION, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 1–2 (NAFTA Law and Policy Series vol. 5, 1998) (stating that 
in 1980, FDI was estimated at $40 billion; in 1994 it jumped to $222 billion; by 1995 it 
had reached $315 billion); see also UNCTAD, Assessing the Impact of the Current Fi-
nancial and Economic Crisis on Global FDI Flows, 3, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/3 (Jan. 19, 2009) (stating that the year 2007 saw unprecedent-
ed levels of FDI flows, “reaching a historic record of $1.8 trillion”); Jeswald W. Salacuse 
& Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment 
F 
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expected to continue.6 Coinciding with this surge is the proliferation of a 
dense network of international agreements pertaining to the protection of 
foreign investment,7 most notably bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”).8 
BITs are agreements between two countries that provide substantive 
standards for the protection of foreign investment, as well as procedures 
for dispute settlement.9 In the absence of a comprehensive international 
legal framework or general customary international law governing for-
eign investment,10 BITs have become the “dominant international vehicle 
through which investment is regulated.”11 In recent decades, BITs have 
flourished to unprecedented levels.12 
While the legal infrastructure created by the BIT network operates on 
an international scale, BITs have become especially prevalent in the Eu-
                                                                                                             
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 67, 71 (2005) (stating that be-
tween 1973 and 2000, FDI growth exceeded that of international trade twelvefold). 
 6. See UNCTAD, World Investment Prospects Survey 2009–2011, 9, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/8 (2009) (stating that while the global economic and financial 
crisis caused significant declines in global FDI flows in 2008 and 2009, a recovery is 
expected beginning in 2010 and will continue to gain momentum through 2011). 
 7. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agree-
ments, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 157 (2005). 
 8. See Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto 
Multilateral Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 303, 305 (2009). BITs are part of the 
larger category of international investment agreements (IIAs), which also includes free 
trade agreements (FTAs) and regional trade agreements. FTAs and regional trade agree-
ment contain foreign investment-related provisions, but such provisions are not their 
primary focus. This Note is concerned only with BITs, which typically deal exclusively 
with foreign investment and are the most proliferated type of IIA. 
 9. See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral Investment 
Agreements, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 263, 263 (2009). 
 10. See infra Part I.A; see also Kelly Connolly, Note, Say What You Mean: Improved 
Drafting Resources as a Means for Increasing the Consistency of Interpretation of Bila-
teral Investment Treaties, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1579, 1609–1610 (2007). 
 11. Andrew T. Guzman, Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 73 (2009). 
 12. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 75 (stating that the impetus of this proli-
feration is the “desire of companies of industrialized states to invest safely and securely 
in developing countries, as well as the consequent need to create a stable international 
legal framework to facilitate and protect those investments”); see also ANDREW 
NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 46–48 
(2009) (By 1979, states had entered into approximately 100 BITs, by 1987, 265 BITs had 
been concluded, and by the end of the 1990s, 1,857 BITs had been concluded); Press 
Release, UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties Quintupled During the 1990s, U.N. 
Doc. TAD/INF/2877 (Dec. 15, 2000) (stating that there were 1,857 BITs by the end of 
the 1990s, while there had only been 385 at the end of the 1980s). 
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ropean Union (“EU”).13 The modern BIT originated in Europe when the 
first BIT was concluded14 between the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Pakistan on November 25, 1959.15 Since that time, EU Member States 
have constituted a majority of the most prolific negotiators of these trea-
ties.16 Central and Eastern European countries in particular have con-
cluded a large number of BITs17 and continue to be considered attractive 
locations for FDI by foreign investors.18 
As the number of BITs concluded by EU Member States continues to 
grow, the nature of the relationship between these treaties and the EU 
legal order garners increasing attention.19 This is because the relatively 
recent accession of many Central and Eastern European countries impli-
cates the potential for conflict between EU legal requirements and BITs 
both between EU Member States (hereinafter, intra-EU BITs) and be-
tween EU Member States and non-EU Member States (hereinafter, extra-
EU BITs).20 In the context of BITs between Member States, the obliga-
tions under these BITs may be inconsistent with or superseded by EU 
law and, therefore, should be terminated.21 With respect to BITs between 
                                                                                                             
 13. Seventy new BITs were concluded between June 2005 and June 2006. Of those 
seventy, EU Member States (excluding South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States) concluded the highest number of BITs, with forty-nine new agree-
ments during this time period. UNCTAD, International Investment Rule-Setting: Trends, 
Emerging Issues and Implications, 3, 5, U.N. Doc. TD/B/COM.2/73 (Jan. 5, 2007). 
 14. To conclude a treaty is to ratify or formalize it. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 126 
(3d ed. 2006). 
 15. See Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Pak.—F.R.G. Nov. 
25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 23 [hereinafter Pak.—F.R.G. BIT]. 
 16. Germany, Switzerland, the UK, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium Lux-
embourg were seven among the top ten signatories of BITs up until 2008. UNCTAD, 
Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements, 3, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/8 (2008). 
 17. See Anca Radu, Foreign Investors in the EU—Which ‘Best Treatment’? Interac-
tions Between Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, 14 EUR. L. J. 237, 238 (Mar. 
2008). 
 18. See Stanimir Alexandrov, The Future of Investment Treaty Protection in Eastern 
Europe, EUR. & MIDDLE E. ARB. REV. (2009), available at 
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/14/sections/53/chapters/511/the-future-
investment-treaty-protection-eastern-europe/, for a description of the recent, dramatic 
increase in FDI in Eastern Europe. 
 19. See Michele Potesta, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the European Union. Re-
cent Developments in Arbitration and Before the ECJ, 8 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTL. 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 225, 230 (2009). 
 20. See Thomas Eilmansberger, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, 46 
COMM. MKT. L. REV. 383, 387 (2009). 
 21. See Christer Soderlund, Intra-EU Investment Protection and the EC Treaty, 24 J. 
INT’L. ARB. 455, 455 (2007). 
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Member States and Non-Member States, the potential exists for direct 
conflict between BITs and EU law, since EU law requires Member States 
to take all necessary steps to eliminate incompatibility between the EC 
Treaty and any other agreements to which they are a party.22 
While the current interface between BITs and the EU legal order re-
veals a degree of legal uncertainty in need of reconciliation, the individu-
al EU Member States have retained jurisdiction over foreign investment, 
and thus the ability to negotiate and conclude international investment 
agreements.23 However, this may change now that the Lisbon Treaty en-
tered into force on December 1, 2009.24 The Lisbon Treaty is an interna-
tional agreement between EU Member States that amends the current 
sources of EU law, namely the EU Treaty and the EC Treaty.25 Its provi-
sions seek to “enhanc[e] the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the 
Union and to improv[e] the coherence of its action.”26 In one of its most 
novel provisions, the Lisbon Treaty transfers competence27 over FDI 
from the Member States to the EU by bringing it under the ambit of the 
EU’s Common Commercial Policy (“CCP”).28 While the treaty’s lan-
guage with respect to FDI appears unequivocal, it is nevertheless unclear 
how it will be interpreted and applied, and therefore, the practical effects 
it will have on the current EU BIT network. Many questions remain un-
answered: 
                                                                                                             
 22. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty]; see also Radu, supra note 17, at 238. 
 23. See Radu, supra note 17, at 238.  
 24. All 27 Member States ratified the Lisbon Treaty. The treaty passed by referendum 
in Ireland, and on November 3, 2009, it was signed by the president of the Czech Repub-
lic, the final country to sign on. Lisbon Treaty, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/info/treaty-of-lisbon/. 
 25. See generally Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 3, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [herei-
nafter Lisbon Treaty]. 
 26. See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 25, at 3 (preamble); see also Dr. Simon Duke, The 
Lisbon Treaty and External Relations, Bulletin of the European Institute of Public Ad-
ministrations No. 2008/01, 13 (“[T]he Lisbon Treaty holds enormous potential for a more 
coherent Union on the international stage). 
 27. Competence is akin to sovereignty. See DANIEL C. K. CHOW & THOMAS J. 
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS 124 
(2008) (stating that the “debate over the external relations power in the EC/EU concerns 
primarily whether the EC/EU has exclusive competence to negotiate and conclude inter-
national treaties binding upon its member states or whether there is a shared competence 
with its member states allowing the states to participate in the negotiations and conclu-
sion of the agreements”). 
 28. See Marc Bungenberg Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After 
Lisbon in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (C. Herrmann & J.P. Ter-
hechte eds., 2009). 
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 Will EU Member States retain the competence to negotiate and 
conclude BITs in the future? 
 What is the legal status of existing BITs concluded by EU Mem-
ber States? 
 Is the EU capable of concluding international investment agree-
ments comparable to BITs? 
 
This Note argues that the EU’s current system of BITs should remain 
intact in the short term because it provides for investment protection and 
arbitral dispute mechanisms of which there are no viable equivalents un-
der the Lisbon Treaty. Part I provides a brief history of the development 
of the modern BIT. Part II offers an overview of the current, well-
established system of both intra-EU BITs and extra-EU BITs. Part III 
describes the changes pertaining to FDI introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. 
Part IV examines the problems that will likely arise as a result of these 
changes and proposes the implementation of interim measures to facili-
tate the gradual transition from a system of Member States mixed com-
petence to a system of EU exclusive competence. This Note concludes 
that while EU competence over FDI is a logical step in the movement 
toward a more streamlined, comprehensive, multilateral EU trade and 
investment system, an expedited overhaul of the current legal structure 
would foster uncertainty and be detrimental to the EU’s continued ability 
to attract FDI and manage foreign-investor expectations. 
I. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND THE EU LEGAL ORDER 
A. A Brief History of BITs Concluded by EU Member States 
The development of the modern BIT originated in Europe in the period 
following World War II,29 at which time individual European countries 
began to negotiate treaties dealing exclusively with foreign investment.30 
The objective of these treaties was to protect foreign investors against 
uncompensated expropriation,31 an area not covered by customary inter-
                                                                                                             
 29. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 68 (stating that in the period after World 
War II, “foreign investors who sought the protection of international investment law en-
countered an ephemeral structure consisting largely of scattered treaty provisions, a few 
questionable customs, and contested general principles of law”). 
 30. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGARET STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
10–11 (1995) (providing a historical context of BITs as an outgrowth of FCNs). 
 31. See Rodney Neufeld, Trade and Investment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 636–637 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009) (stating 
that “direct expropriation involves the taking of an investment by the host State through 
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national law.32 The first BIT was concluded between the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and Pakistan in 1959,33 after which several other Euro-
pean countries followed suit.34 In the late 1980s, in efforts to attract for-
eign investment and to encourage economic development, several of the 
countries that now comprise Central and Eastern Europe concluded BITs 
with developed countries.35 European countries alone concluded forty-
seven BITs between January 2005 and June 2006.36 While less than five 
hundred BITs were in force in the 1990s,37 there are currently more than 
2,600 in force.38 BITs were initially concluded asymmetrically between a 
developed and a developing country,39 but this arrangement is slowly 
                                                                                                             
seizure of the property or interest, or through its compulsory transfer, for example, to a 
state-owned enterprise or domestic investor . . . an indirect expropriation often consists of 
a series of government acts that has the effect of rendering the investor’s property rights 
useless”). 
 32. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 41 (stating that the development 
of international investment agreements “was primarily a response to the uncertainties and 
inadequacies of the customary international law of state responsibility for injuries to 
aliens and their property”); see also M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 89 (2d ed. 2004) (stating that while it is a principle of customary 
law that when a host country unlawfully takes the property of the foreign investor it must 
compensate the foreign investor for this taking, there is considerable disagreement on this 
standard of compensation and how it should be calculated); Andrew T. Guzman, Why 
LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 641 (1998) (Prior to WWII, expropriation of a foreign 
investor’s property was governed by the “Hull Rule” under customary international law, 
which required that compensation for expropriation be “prompt, adequate, and effective.” 
However, this rule fell out of favor following WWII). 
 33. See Pak.—F.R.G. BIT, supra note 15; see also UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties in the Mid–1990s, 177–179, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7 (1998) (reporting 
historical statistics of all of the BITs entered into by Germany); UNCTC, Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties, 7,  U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/65 (stating that Germany was particularly con-
cerned with the future protection of its foreign investments, as it had lost all of its foreign 
assets following WWI and WWII). 
 34. See NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, supra note 12, at 42–43 (stating that the capi-
tal-exporting states of Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy, the Belgo-Luxembourg Eco-
nomic Union (BLEU), Sweden, Denmark, Norway, France, and the UK began to con-
clude BITs soon after Germany). 
 35. See UNCTAD, International Investment Rule-making: Stocktaking, Challenges 
and the Way Forward, 15, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2007/3 (2008).  
 36. See Radu, supra note 17, at 238. 
 37. See id. at 237. 
 38. 2,676 BITs were in effect as of 2009. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009: 
Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Development and Development, xxii, U.N. 
Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2009 (2009).  
 39. See UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959–1999, 1–2, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000) (stating that BITs were initially concluded between a devel-
oped, capital-exporting country and a developing, capital-importing country. Developing 
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eroding as developing countries enter into BITs with other developing 
countries and transition economies pursue BITs on their own.40 
This expansive and growing network of BITs is a by-product of re-
peatedly failed efforts to establish an international investment frame-
work.41 In 1995, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (“OECD”)42 attempted to negotiate the Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment (“MAI”).43 The MAI sought to consolidate rules on 
international foreign investment into a single legal instrument that would 
be open to accession by both OECD and non-OECD members.44 Howev-
er, this agreement met a great deal of opposition and was consequently 
abandoned in 1998.45 The objective of the MAI was resurrected in 2001 
when the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference agreed to take up negotia-
tions on trade and investment beginning in 2003, and established a nego-
tiating group on trade and investment.46 This plan was similarly aban-
doned in 2004.47 Due to the lack of an international framework govern-
ing FDI, the dense network of BITs “[f]or all practical purposes . . . has 
become the fundamental source of international law in the area of foreign 
investment.”48 
B. The Basic Features of BITs 
BITs contain substantive provisions for the protection of foreign in-
vestment as well as procedural provisions for investment dispute resolu-
tion.49 In terms of substantive provisions, the vast majority of BITs iden-
                                                                                                             
countries entered into BITs in order to attract foreign investors and reap the benefits of 
FDI. However, beginning in the late 1980s, this paradigm shifted and BITs were increa-
singly concluded between two developing countries).  
 40. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection 
in Denial of Justice Claims 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 832 (2005). 
 41. See UNCTAD, Lessons from the MAI, U.N. Doc. No. 
UNCTAD/ITE/ITT/Misc.22 (1999). 
 42. The OECD, “based in Paris, is an organization of thirty leading industrialized 
countries that deals with economic and social issues of concern to its members.” It works 
with the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 27, 
at 20–21. 
 43. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 32, at 291. 
 44. See Alfred Escher, The Multilateral Investment Treaty, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 69 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher, eds. 1999). 
 45. See UNCTAD, Lessons from the MAI, supra note 41.  
 46. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 27, at 324. 
 47. Id. 
 48. SALACUSE & SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 70. 
 49. See Theresa McGhie, Bilateral and Multilateral Investment Treaties, in LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 109 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds., 
1999). 
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tify the scope of investments covered under the respective treaty.50 The 
very first BIT, between Germany and Pakistan, provided for a broad de-
finition of “investment.”51 This inclusiveness is characteristic of the BITs 
concluded over the past fifty years.52 While the breadth of coverage of 
investment articulated in a BIT can vary based upon the intentions of the 
negotiating parties,53 the prevailing definition adopted by BITs con-
cluded by EU Member States describes “investment” as including “every 
kind of asset.”54 This encompassing definition, thus, goes beyond the 
coverage of FDI55 and can even extend protection to portfolio invest-
ments.56 
                                                                                                             
 50. See DOLZER AND STEVENS, supra note 30, at 25–26. 
 51. See Pak.—F.R.G. BIT, supra note 15, art. 8 (stating that the term “investment shall 
comprise capital brought into the territory of the other Party for investment in various 
forms in the shape of assets such as foreign exchange, goods, property rights, patents and 
technical knowledge. The term “investment” shall also include the returns derived from 
and ploughed back into such “investment” . . . Any partnerships, companies or assets of 
similar kind, created by the utilization of the above-mentioned assets shall be regarded as 
“investment”). 
 52. “Investment” is typically defined very broadly in BITs, and includes both the 
tangible and intangible assets of the foreign investor. See SORNARAHAH, supra note 32, at 
220–221. 
 53. See UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends in Investment 
Rulemaking, 7, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2006/5 (2007) [hereinafter UNCTAD, BITs 
1995–2006] (stating that some BITs define “investment” broadly, but additionally pro-
vide for a list of clarifications limiting or excluding particular kinds of investments).  
 54. DOLZER AND STEVENS, supra note 30, at 27; see also UNCTAD, BITs 1995–2006, 
supra note 53, at 8 (stating that the “asset-based” definition of “investment” usually in-
cludes “five categories of assets: first, movable and immovable property and any related 
property rights such as mortgages, liens or pledges, second, various types of interests in 
companies, such as shares, stock, bonds, debentures or any other form of participation in 
a company, business enterprise or joint venture; third, claims to money and claims under 
a contract having a financial value and loans directly related to a specific investment; 
fourth, intellectual property rights; and fifth, business concessions, that is rights conferred 
by law or under contracts”). 
 55. See UNCTAD, BITs 1995–2006, supra note 53, at 8; see also Neufeld, supra note 
31, at 621 (“To ‘invest’ means to expend money, effort, or time into an undertaking with 
the intention of deriving profit. However, ‘foreign direct investment’ (FDI) implies some-
thing more than the mere purchase of shares for the sake of the interest, dividends or 
profits. Traditionally, States have distinguished FDI from other investment . . . FDI dis-
tinguishes itself from portfolio investment in that it ‘consists of a transaction made by a 
foreigner in a host state which is intended to set up a long term relationship with a party 
in the host state’”). 
 56. See Neufeld, supra note 31, at 622 (stating that portfolio investment is any type of 
foreign investment that is not classified as FDI); see also SORNARAHAH, supra note 32, at 
227 (describing portfolio investment as “[investment] instruments connected with com-
panies like shares or unconnected with them like promissory notes and bonds”). 
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BITs can vary in substantive detail, but their structure and general 
composition are relatively uniform.57 They contain preliminary state-
ments that articulate their purpose and aim, typically the “reciprocal en-
couragement and protection of investment flows between the two 
states.”58 They provide for core protections including national treat-
ment,59 most favored nation (“MFN”) treatment,60 compensation for ex-
propriation,61 and rights to transfer capital and returns.62 Due to this pro-
tective framework for substantive rights, BITs play an important role in 
alleviating the concerns and vulnerabilities of foreign investors who as-
sume the inherent risks associated with FDI.63 
In the event that a party to a BIT does not comply with its treaty obli-
gations, BITs also contain provisions for investment dispute resolution.64 
Arguably, the most significant facet of BITs is their provision for inves-
tor-state dispute settlement, in which foreign investors may directly sub-
                                                                                                             
 57. See SORNARAHAH, supra note 32, at 89. 
 58. Id. at 217.  
 59. In the context of BITs, national treatment refers to the “obligation of contracting 
parties to grant investors of the other contracting party treatment no less favourable than 
the treatment they grant to investments of their own investors.  The effect is to create a 
level playing field between foreign and domestic investors in the relevant market.” 
UNCTAD, BITs 1995–2006, supra note 53, at 33. 
 60. In the context of BITs, the MFN treatment standard “means that investments or 
investors of one contracting party are entitled to treatment by the other contracting party 
that is no less favourable than the treatment the latter grants to investments or investors of 
any other third country.” See id. at 38. 
 61. J. Frederick Truitt, Expropriation of Foreign Investment: Summary of the Post 
World War II Experience of American and British Investors in Less Developed Countries, 
1 J. INT’L BUS. STUDIES 21, 24 (1970) (defining expropriation as “an official taking by a 
sovereign state of the tangible property of alien corporate ownership with a view toward 
the continued exploitation of that property for the public utility of the expropriating state 
in lieu of continued ownership and control by private foreign enterprise”); see also 
Schwebel, supra note 9, at 265–266 (“If there is a taking by the state of the foreign in-
vestment, by means direct or indirect, the state is treaty-bound to pay prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation”). 
 62. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 43; see also Press Release, 
UNCTAD, Analysis of Bilateral Investment Treaties Finds Growth in Agreements, New 
Areas of Focus, UNCTAD/PRESS/IN/2007/014 (Dec. 4, 2007), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/templates/Webflyer.asp?docID=8270&intItemID=1528&lang=1 
(report concludes that “more countries concluding these treaties are placing greater em-
phasis on public concerns such as health, environment, core labour rights, national securi-
ty, transparency in information exchange and rulemaking”). 
 63. The “basic assumptions behind BITs are that a bilateral treaty with clear and en-
forceable rules to protect and facilitate foreign investment reduces risks that the investor 
would otherwise face and that such reductions in risks, all things being equal, encourage 
investment.” Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 77. 
 64. See id. at 87.  
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mit violations of BITs by a host state to international arbitration.65 For-
eign investors consider these arbitration proceedings, which are outside 
the jurisdiction of the host state, preferable to filing a claim against the 
host state in its domestic courts.66 This is because this system prevents 
the host state from enjoying a “home court advantage.”67 
The main forum chosen for dispute settlement is the International Cen-
tre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”),68 which was for-
mally established in 1965 for the primary purpose of resolving disputes 
between host countries and foreign private investors.69 Other forums for 
dispute arbitration include the International Center for Dispute Resolu-
tion, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the Arbitration Insti-
tute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.70 According to statistics 
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, by the 
end of 2007, there were two hundred and ninety known investment treaty 
arbitrations, the majority of which were commenced under BITs.71 While 
                                                                                                             
 65. See Alexandrov, supra note 18. (The judgments awarded in these arbitrations are 
binding, and may require that the host state “pay substantial monetary damages to the 
injured investor”); see also Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties: Of Breaching of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developing 
and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 
142 (2006).  Wong explains: “[s]ignificantly, only states (and not the investors) enter into 
BITs. Notwithstanding, the investor is able to enforce directly its rights under the BIT 
through the BIT’s dispute settlement provisions.” Id. at 142; Salacuse & Sullivan, supra 
note 5, at 88 (stating that “granting a private party the right to bring an action in an inter-
national tribunal against a sovereign state with respect to an investment dispute is a revo-
lutionary innovation that now seems to be taken for granted”); Schwebel, supra note 9, at 
267 (stating that “[t]his extraordinary innovation displaces the uneven intervention of 
states in exercise of their right of diplomatic protection of the interests of their nationals 
by according the foreign investor standing under international law, by virtue of the treaty, 
to pursue arbitration against the host state”). 
 66. See Schwebel, supra note 9, at 263 (Foreign investors seeking legal recourse for 
the violation of BIT provisions may consider the domestic courts to be biased against 
them. The foreign investor could alternatively seek legal intervention from the country of 
which they were a national, but this too was not always an effective route for the foreign 
investor). 
 67. George M. von Mehren, Navigating Through Investor-State Arbitrations – An 
Overview of Bilateral Investment Treaty Claims, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 69, 70 (1994). 
 68. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nation-
als of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575, U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID 
Convention].  
 69. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 32, at 250. 
 70. See von Mehren, supra note 67, at 70. 
 71. Between 1987 and 2007, seventy-eight percent of investment treaty arbitrations 
were brought on allegations of the violation of a BIT. See UNCTAD, Latest Develop-
ments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/IIA/2008/3 
(2008).  
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these arbitrations have been criticized for their lack of uniformity and 
transparency in decision-making,72 they nevertheless offer benefits to 
host countries and investors.73 Dispute settlement provisions in BITs 
providing for this type of arbitration enable host countries to attract for-
eign investment, and allow foreign investors to “manage the risk asso-
ciated with investing in a foreign country.”74 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BITS AND THE PRE-LISBON EU LEGAL 
ORDER  
A. The Division of Competences 
The structure of the EU legal order is quite complex, consisting of a 
supranational legal system which coexists alongside the legal systems of 
the individual Member States.75 Under this arrangement, Member States 
transfer some of their national sovereignty to the European Community 
(“EC”),76 and in effect become governed by Community law.77 Up until 
the passage of the Lisbon Treaty, the primary sources of Community law 
were a set of treaties which formed the basis for “everything the EU 
does.”78 The most important of these treaties are the EC Treaty79 (also 
                                                                                                             
 72. For an in-depth discussion of the negative impact of inconsistent interpretations 
of BITs by ad hoc arbitration panels, see CONNOLLY, supra note 10. See generally Susan 
Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public Inter-
national Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005). 
 73. See von Mehren, supra note 67, at 76. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Matej Avbelj, The EU and the Many Faces of Legal Pluralism. Toward a 
Coherent or Uniform EU Legal Order?, 2 CROATION YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW AND 
POLICY 377, 380 (2006). 
 76. See DERRICK WYATT & ALAN ASHWOOD, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 125 (5th ed. 
2006); see also Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos V. Nederlanse Administratie det Melas-
tingen, 1963 E.C.R. 3, Summary ¶ 3 (stating that “the European Economic Community 
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which com-
prise not only the Member States but also their nationals”); CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra 
note 27, at 124 (stating that the EU’s structure consists of “three pillars,” one of which is 
the EC which carries out the legal functions of the EU). 
 77. See JEAN-VICTOR LOUIS, THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER 11 (European Commun-
ities 2d ed. 1990). 
 78. The Lisbon Treaty amends, but does not replace these treaties. To avoid confu-
sion, Part II.C of this Note discusses the EC Treaty and the EU Treaty in the present 
tense, as the majority of their provisions remain intact; see also KAREN DAVIES, 
UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION LAW 48 (3rd ed. 2007) (stating that these treaties 
include the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 1951; the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 1957; the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community 1957; the Merger Treaty 1965; the Budgetary Treaties 
862 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:3 
known as the Treaty of Rome or the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community) and the EU Treaty80 (also known as the Maas-
tricht Treaty or the Treaty on the European Union). The EC Treaty is the 
major governing instrument in the EU, regarded as a kind of constitu-
tion.81 Its scope includes economic, social, environmental, and regional 
policies.82 The EC Treaty seeks “to lay the foundation of an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe,” and to “strengthen the unity” of the 
Member State economies.83 The EU Treaty, which entered into force in 
1994, created the “three pillar” structure that forms the basis of the “Eu-
ropean Union.”84 In its preamble, the EU Treaty sets as its objective the 
“strengthening and the convergence” of the Member State economies.85 
Thus, together these treaties set forth the broad goals of integrating the 
EU Member States and facilitating cooperation at the political, social, 
and in particular, economic level. 
Despite the EU’s broad goal of an integrated Europe, it may only act 
within the confines of the powers attributed to it by Community law un-
der various treaties.86 Community competence, or sovereignty, is divided 
into three principal categories: exclusive, shared, and supporting.87 In 
areas of exclusive Community competence, power is held solely by the 
                                                                                                             
1970 and 1975; the Single European Union Act 1986; the Treaty on European Union 
1992; the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997; the Treaty of Nice 2000.) 
 79. See EC Treaty, supra note 22. 
 80. See Treaty on European Union (EU), 7 February 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 
I.L.M. 253 [hereinafter EU Treaty]. 
 81. LINDA SENDEN, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 37 (2004). Because the 
EC Treaty is the most comprehensive treaty governing the EU, the EU law discussed in 
this Note relies predominantly on the EC Treaty. 
 82. See Id. 
 83. EC Treaty, supra note 22, at preamble. 
 84. See How the European Union Works: Your Guide to the EU Institutions, E.U. 
Commission, http://www.eurunion.org/infores/HowEUWorks072007.doc (last visited 
June 2010). 
 85. See EU Treaty, supra note 80, at preamble. For the sake of avoiding confusion, 
this Note refers to the European Union to mean both the European Economic Community 
created by the EC Treaty and the European Union as it stands today. 
 86. See e.g., EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 5(1) (stating that the Community “shall act 
within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and all of the objectives 
assigned to it herein”); see also EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 5(2) (stating that “in areas 
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives if the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Com-
munity; EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 5(3) (stating that “any action by the Community 
shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty”). 
 87. See WYATT & ASHWOOD, supra note 76, at 91–97. 
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Community.88 Member States cannot act autonomously, but rather, can 
only act if authorized by the Community.89 In the category of shared 
competence, both the Community and the Member States are competent 
to exercise their shared regulatory power in a given area.90 However, in 
exercising this power, Member States must concurrently comply with 
their obligations under the provisions of the various treaties.91 Finally, 
under the category of supporting competence, the Community establishes 
broad goals in a field, but the Member States retain exclusive regulatory 
power to act.92 In summary, the Community cannot act unless it has the 
authority to do so under the Treaties; Member States retain competence 
in areas that have not been specifically delegated to the EC.93 
Based on the division of competences under the EC Treaty, both the 
EU and the Member States retain regulatory control over different as-
pects of foreign investment.94 The EU can exercise its competence by 
adopting measures relating to foreign investment to the extent that it acts 
“within the limits of the power conferred upon it” by the EC Treaty.95 
The EC Treaty contains a number of provisions relating to foreign in-
vestment. Under Articles 43 and 48 through 56, the Treaty provides for 
rights of establishment.96 Articles 56 through 60 deal with movement of 
capital.97 Under Article 310, the Treaty gives the Community the power 
to conclude agreements relating to reciprocal rights and obligations.98 
Finally, under Article 181, the EU can conclude agreements with devel-
oping countries.99 Thus, all of these provisions touch upon the EU’s in-
ternal and external competence relating to foreign investments. For that 
reason, these provisions are coterminous with BITs.100 However, while 
                                                                                                             
 88. See DAVIES, supra note 78, at 25; see also WYATT & ASHWOOD, supra note 76, at 
91–92 (Under the EC Treaty, exclusive competence has been uncontroversial in only 
three cases: the regulation of external trade under the common commercial policy, which 
is based upon Article 133 EC; the conservation of marine biological resources; and 
monetary policy for those Member States which have adopted the euro). 
 89. See WYATT & ASHWOOD, supra note 76, at 91. 
 90. Id. at 92. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 95. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Eilmansberger, supra note 20, at 389. 
 95. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 5(1); see also Jan Ceyssens, Towards a Com-
mon Investment Policy? – Foreign Investment in the European Constitution, 32 LEGAL 
ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 260 (2005). 
 96. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 43–48. 
 97. Id. art. 56–60. 
 98. Id. art. 310. 
 99. Id. art. 181. 
 100. See supra Part I.B. 
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the EC Treaty contains investment-related provisions, because it does not 
confer exclusive competence over foreign investment upon the EU, nor 
does it confer upon the EU the power to conclude international invest-
ment agreements with non-EU countries, these areas fall within the com-
petence of the EU Member States.101 
Since the EU has limited powers to adopt measures pertaining to for-
eign investment under the EC Treaty, EU Member States predominantly 
exercise competence in this field.102 Member States have largely imple-
mented this power through the negotiation and conclusion of BITs.103 
However, the interaction between provisions contained in BITs and the 
EU legal order can lead to overlap and incompatibility issues.104 The in-
terface between BITs entered into by EU Member States and the EU le-
gal order is significant in two contexts: intra-EU BITs, and extra-EU 
BITs.105 
B. Intra-EU BITs 
The majority of intra-EU BITs resulted from the relatively recent ac-
cession of twelve Central and Eastern European nations to the European 
Union.106 These countries entered into BITs with EU Member States 
prior to their accession, creating the current situation in which both par-
ties to the BIT are now Member States.107 The number of intra-EU BITs 
is quite significant;108 approximately 190 BITs of this nature are current-
                                                                                                             
 101. See WYATT & ASHWOOD, supra note 76, at 91–97. 
 102. See Ceyssens, supra note 95, at 259; see also Soderlund, supra note 21, at 461. 
 103. See Ceyssens, supra note 95, at 268. 
 104. See Radu, supra note 17, at 238 (explaining the difficulty encountered by EU 
Member States in concluding BITs that do not conflict with EU law and that do not pre-
judice foreign investors). 
 105. See Potesta, supra note 19, at 225. 
 106. In 2004, 10 countries acceded to the EU, including Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, Es-
tonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. Most re-
cently, Bulgaria and Romania acceded in January 2007. 2000-Today: A Decade of Fur-
ther Expansion, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/abc/history/2000_today/index_en.htm (last 
visited Dec. 21, 2009); see also Soderlund, supra note 21, at 455 (stating that there are 
two BITs concluded between “old” EU Member States. Germany concluded BITs with 
Portugal and Greece prior to their accession to the EU in 1980 and 1986, respectively. 
However, no foreign investor has invoked either of these BITs in bringing an investment 
dispute against one of these countries). 
 107. See Soderlund, supra note 21, at 455.  
 108. “The top signatories – Germany, UK France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg – count more than 500 BITs. From January 2005 to June 2006 only, Euro-
pean countries concluded 47 BITs.” Radu, supra note 17, at 237. 
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ly in force.109 The recent influx of intra-EU BITs has generated a number 
of questions concerning the relationship between EU law and the obliga-
tions these countries have undertaken through BITs.110 These questions 
include whether intra-EU investment issues are governed by EC law or 
the domestic law of the Member States, whether intra-EU BITs are su-
perseded by EC law, and whether intra-EU investor-state arbitration me-
chanisms conflict with the EC legal order.111 
These uncertainties were recently addressed through arbitral proceed-
ings in Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech Republic.112 In 1991, the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic, seeking to attract FDI to its newly established 
free market economy, entered into a BIT with the Netherlands.113 In 
1993, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic separated into two sove-
reign states, and the Czech Republic assumed the international obliga-
tions arising from the BIT concluded with the Netherlands.114 In 2003, an 
investment dispute arose between Dutch sugar producer Eastern Sugar 
B.V. and the Czech Republic.115 In December 2003, the dispute was 
submitted to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal of the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) pursuant to Article 8 of 
the BIT.116 Article 8 provides in pertinent part that “[e]ach Contracting 
Party hereby consents to submit a dispute . . . to an arbitral tribunal . . . 
[which] shall determine its own procedure applying the arbitration rules 
of UNCITRAL.”117 Subsequently, in 2004, the Czech Republic acceded 
to the EU pursuant to the Accession Treaty of April 16, 2003.118 Because 
                                                                                                             
 109. For figures on BITs entered into by each EU Member State, see Country-Specific 
Lists of BITs, UNCTAD, 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1 (last visited Dec. 
22, 2009); see also Radu, supra note 17, at 238 (stating that the proliferation of BITs 
between countries in the Eastern bloc exceeded 150 prior to these countries acceding to 
the EU). 
 110. See Alexandrov, supra note 18. 
 111. See Soderlund, supra note 21, at 460. 
 112. Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, SCC No. 088/2004, 
UNCITRAL (Mar. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Eastern Sugar]. 
 113. Agreement on Encouragement of Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Neth.-
Czech Rep.-Slovk., Apr. 24, 1991. See also Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶ 2 (stating 
that until 2002, the Czech Republic had concluded BITs with all countries that are cur-
rently EU Member States). 
 114. See Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶ 5. 
 115. See id. ¶ 12. 
 116. See id. ¶ 13. 
 117. See Agreement on encouragement and protection of investments, Czech Repub-
lic-Netherlands, supra note 112, art. 8. 
 118. See Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶ 14. 
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the Netherlands was already an EU Member State, the BIT effectively 
became  an intra-EU BIT. 
In this investment dispute, the foreign investor of Eastern Sugar B.V. 
alleged that Czech authorities discriminated against him by issuing three 
decrees that adversely affected Eastern Sugar.119 The tribunal found that 
the Czech Republic had violated the fair and equitable treatment standard 
set forth in Article 3(1) of the BIT because one of the decrees that it is-
sued unduly “targeted” Eastern Sugar and constituted a “discriminatory 
and unreasonable measure,”120 and awarded 25 million Euros in damages 
to Eastern Sugar.121 While this award was substantial, the tribunal’s deci-
sion is particularly significant for its discussion of intra-EU BITs and the 
tribunal’s holding that the mere fact of accession of a country to the EU 
does not render an intra-EU BIT irrelevant or invalid.122 
The Czech Republic argued that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction 
over claims brought by Eastern Sugar to the extent that they pertained to 
a time subsequent to the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU.123 Ac-
cording to the Czech Republic, when it became an EU Member State, 
“this changed the relationship that it had with the Netherlands sufficient-
ly to terminate or limit the application of the BIT implicitly, and as a re-
sult, to put an end to the benefits and protection enjoyed under the BIT 
by a Dutch investor such as Eastern Sugar.”124 
Pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, it was the role of the 
arbitral tribunal to determine on its own whether or not it had jurisdiction 
over the dispute.125 The tribunal noted that neither the Europe Agree-
ment, under which the Czech Republic became a candidate for EU acces-
sion, nor the Accession Treaty, pursuant to which the Czech Republic 
ultimately acceded to the EU, “provide expressly” that the BIT would be 
terminated.126 Furthermore, the BIT itself did not state that it would be 
                                                                                                             
 119. See Potesta, supra note 19, at 227. 
 120. See Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶¶ 335–338. See also Agreement on encou-
ragement and protection of investments, Czech Republic-Netherlands, supra note 113, 
art. 3(1) (stating that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment 
to the investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair, by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures, the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal thereof by those investors”). 
 121. See Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶ 368. 
 122. See Marek Wierzbowski & Aleksander Gubrynowicz, Conflict of Norms Stem-
ming from Intra-EU BITs and EU Legal Obligations: Some Remarks on Possible Solu-
tions in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 552–553 (2009). 
 123. See Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶ 112. 
 124. Id. ¶ 117. 
 125. Id. ¶ 116. 
 126. Id. ¶ 143. 
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terminated in the case that both parties became EU Member States.127 
The arbitral tribunal proceeded to analyze the relationship between the 
Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT and the EC Treaty under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”).128  
Under Article 42 of the VCLT, a treaty is only terminated according to 
its own terms, or the terms of the VCLT.129 Article 59 of the VCLT pro-
vides that a treaty is terminated if 1) all the parties to it conclude a later 
treaty relating to the “same subject matter,” 2) the later treaty established 
that the parties “intended to be governed by that treaty,” or 3) the provi-
sions of the later treaty “are so far incompatible with those of the earlier 
one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same 
time.”130 The arbitrators concluded that none of these conditions were 
                                                                                                             
 127. See Agreement on Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Czech Repub-
lic-Netherlands, supra note 113, art. 13(2) (“Unless notice of termination has been given 
by either Contracting Party at least six months before the date of the expiry of its validity, 
the present Agreement shall be extended tacitly for periods of ten years, each Contracting 
Party reserving the right to terminate the Agreement upon notice of at least six months 
before the date of expiry of the current period of validity”). 
 128. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
115 U.N.T.S 331 (entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
The Vienna Convention is a treaty concerning customary international law on treaties 
between states, and is binding upon its signatories. As of May 2009, it has been ratified 
by 109 parties, including the Czech Republic and the Netherlands. The treaty provides 
the general rules for treaty interpretation. 
 129. Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art. 42. Article 42 of the Vienna Convention, 
Validity and continuance in force of treaties, reads in its entirety:  
(1) The validity of a treaty or of the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty 
may be impeached only through the application of the present Convention.  
(2) The termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a party, 
may take place only as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty 
or of the present Convention. The same rule applies to suspension of the opera-
tion of a treaty. 
 130. Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art. 59. Article 59 of the Vienna Convention, 
Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty implied by conclusion of a later 
treaty, reads in its entirety:  
(1) A treaty shall be considered terminated if all the parties to it conclude a lat-
er treaty relating to the same subject matter and (a) it appears from the later 
treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the matter should 
be governed by that treaty; or (b) the provisions of the later treaty are so far in-
compatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of 
being applied at the same time;  
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met, and affirmed the tribunal’s jurisdiction over the proceedings.131 
Thus, the tribunal held that “EU law has not automatically superseded 
the BIT as a result of the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU.”132 
Considering the number of intra-EU BITs currently in force and the 
potential for the interaction between those BITs and the EU legal order to 
be a factor raised in future arbitral proceedings, the Eastern Sugar deci-
sion is significant beyond this particular tribunal’s decision. The EC 
Commission has pressured the Member States to terminate, or at the very 
least to renegotiate, the BITs to which they are a party in order to avoid 
the disparate obligations that stem from the BITs and EU Law.133 The 
Commission takes the position that “there appears to be no need for 
agreements of this kind in the single market” because “it would appear 
that their content is superseded by Community law.”134 Some countries 
have followed this suggestion.135 For example, in 2008, the BIT between 
Italy and Hungary was terminated, and in 2009, the Czech Republic in-
itiated the termination process for 23 BITs it had concluded with EU 
Member States prior to its EU-accession.136  
However, the majority of Member States believe that the existing BIT 
framework should be maintained.137 According to their position, Member 
States should be able to conclude treaties amongst themselves, and those 
                                                                                                             
(2) The earlier treaty shall be considered as only suspended in operation if it 
appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that such was the inten-
tions of the parties. 
 131. See Eastern Sugar, supra note 112, ¶¶ 159–171. 
 132. See id. ¶ 172; see also Soderlund, supra note 21, at 455 (stating that in future 
scenarios like that of Eastern Sugar in which host states raise the jurisdictional defense 
that a BIT is no longer operative because it became an intra-EU BIT, these foreign inves-
tors will be likely unsuccessful in invoking this defense). 
 133. See Wierzbowski, supra note 122, at 555. 
 134. EU Members Review Intra-European BITs in Light of Potential Overlap with EU 
Law, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, 20 June 2007. 
 135. See id; see also Alfred Escher, Current Developments, Legal Challenges an Defi-
nition of FDI, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 16–19 (Daniel D. 
Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds., 1999) for a brief discussion of the EU’s goal of “further-
ance of economic integration and the facilitation of cross-border investments within the 
EU.” Id. at 18.  
 136. See UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements, 
supra note 16, at 5; see also Bilateral Investment Treaties and the EU, http://www.cms-
aacs.com/bilateral-investment-treaties-and-the-eu-05-26-2009 (last visited Dec. 16, 2009) 
(stating that despite a degree of uncertainty regarding the interface between intra-EU 
BITs and the EU legal order, the Czech Republic should reconsider its plans to terminate 
its intra-EU BITs, as they provide comfort to foreign investors). 
 137. See EU Member States Reject the Call to Terminate Intra-EU Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, 10 February 2009. 
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treaties currently in force between Member States should remain so as 
long as the Member States comply with their obligations under the EC 
Treaty.138 At this time, the issue has not been brought to the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”),139 and thus, the potential for inconsistent deci-
sions by arbitral tribunals leaves the status of intra-EU BITs unclear.140 
C. Extra-EU BITs 
Incompatibility problems also arise in the context of extra-EU BITs. 
Under Article 307(2) of the EC Treaty, Member States “shall take all 
appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities” between their treaty 
obligations with non-EU countries and their obligations under the EC 
Treaty.141 This treaty provision suggests that recently acceded Member 
States must renegotiate their BITs with non-EU Member States in order 
to eliminate inconsistency with EU law.142 However, under Article 
307(1) of the EC Treaty, the “rights and obligations arising from agree-
ments . . . or acceding States, before the date of their accession, between 
one or more Member State on the one hand, and one or more third coun-
tries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Trea-
ty.”143 Nonetheless, several Member States have followed the suggestion 
of the Commission. For example, in 2003, the European Commission, 
the United States, and eight Central Eastern European Countries prepar-
ing to join the European Union, signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU), which ensured that the BITs concluded between the U.S. and 
these acceding countries were compatible with the EU’s laws and regula-
                                                                                                             
 138. See Lorenza Mola, Which Role for the EU in the Development of International 
Investment Law? para. 5.1 (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law, Working Paper No. 27/08, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1154583. 
 139. The jurisdiction of the ECJ includes the power to bring enforcement actions 
against Member States. In the future the European Commission may bring a direct action 
against Member States that it deems are failing to fulfill its obligations under EU law by 
refusing to terminate intra-EU BITs. See DAVIES, supra note 78, at 40–41; see also CHOW 
& SCHOENBAUM, supra note 27, at 125 (stating that the ECJ consists of one judge from 
each EU Member State and has the final word in interpreting the EC Treaty). 
 140. See Potesta, supra note 19, at 238. 
 141. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 307. 
 142. See UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements, 
supra note 16, at 5 (stating that “in 2008 the Czech Republic concluded five protocols on 
the amendment to originals BITs, a process reported as negotiations of BITs. These nego-
tiations are in response to article 307 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(EC Treaty) and seek to bring the country’s BITs into conformity with EU law”); see also 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development; National and 
International Perspectives, supra note 3, at 59 (stating that “EU-accession countries will 
have to harmonize their FDI regimes with EU regulations”). 
 143. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 307. 
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tions.144 While the MOU represents forward progress in the elimination 
of existing incompatibilities, it does not have legal force and only applies 
to the specific BITs designated in the memorandum.145 For that reason, 
all other extra-EU BITs remain susceptible to compatibility issues.146 
The incompatibility problems arising from the relationship between the 
EU legal order and extra-EU BITs were recently addressed in European 
Commission v. Republic of Austria147 and European Commission v. Re-
public of Sweden.148 In these cases, the European Commission brought 
infringement proceedings under Article 307(2) of the EC Treaty against 
Austria and Sweden; the Commission alleged that the countries had 
failed to harmonize provisions contained in BITs with non-EU Member 
States negotiated prior to their accession to the EU with EU law.149 Prior 
to their accession to the EU, Austria and Sweden entered into BITs with 
several non-European countries.150 All of these BITs contained clauses 
“under which each party guarantee[d] to the investors of the other party . 
. . the free transfer . . . of payments connected with an investment.”151 In 
                                                                                                             
 144. See Eight Acceding Countries and U.S. Sign Bilateral Investment Understanding, 
EUR. UNION DELEGATION TO THE U.S.A. (Sept. 23, 2003), 
http://www.eurunion.org/eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2079&Item
id=58 (stating that “A number of provisions in the BITs were contrary to the existing EU 
legislation and needed to be amended prior to accession. The acceding countries con-
cerned are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia. The European Commission is pleased that a satisfactory solution has been 
found, showing that EU enlargement can be beneficial to third countries”). 
 145. See Radu, supra note 17, at 238.  
 146. See id. 
 147. See C-205/06, European Commission v. Republic of Austria, [2009] E.C.R. [he-
reinafter Austria Proceedings]. 
 148. See C-249/06, European Commission v. Republic of Sweden, [2009] E.C.R. [he-
reinafter Sweden Proceedings].  
 149. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147; Sweden Proceedings, supra note 148; 
see also EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 226 (explaining that if the Commission believes 
that a Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under the EC Treaty, it shall give 
the country formal notice of its opinion on the matter and provide the country with the 
opportunity to submit its own observations. If the country does not comply with the 
Commission’s opinion, the Commission can commence infringement proceedings against 
a Member State which it believes has infringed upon Community law); EC Treaty, supra 
note 22, art. 230 (stating that the ECJ has jurisdiction over infringement proceedings 
brought by the European Commission against Member States); Potesta, supra note 19, at 
238. 
 150. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 1 (listing the countries that Austria 
entered into BITs with prior to its EU-accession); Sweden Proceedings, supra note 148, ¶ 
1 (listing the countries that Sweden entered into BITs with prior to its EU-accession). 
 151. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 3; Sweden Proceedings, supra note 
148, ¶ 3. 
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both cases, the Commission objected to these clauses, maintaining that 
they precluded Austria and Sweden from complying with their obliga-
tions under the EC Treaty.152 Because these EC Treaty provisions guar-
anteed the free transfer of capital, they clashed with Article 57(2),153 Ar-
ticle 59,154 and Article 60155 of the EC Treaty, which enable the EU to 
regulate movement of capital between EU Member States and non-EU 
countries, as well as restrict the flow of capital in exceptional circums-
tances.156 Thus, the Commission argued that Austria and Sweden failed 
to take appropriate steps to eliminate incompatibilities with their obliga-
tions under these BITs and under the EC Treaty.157 
The major point of contention in European Commission v. Republic of 
Austria and European Commission v. Republic of Sweden was the extent 
to which Article 307(2) of the EC Treaty requires Member States to en-
sure that their BITs with non-EU countries comply with EU law.158 In 
regards to the pertinent EC Treaty articles, the Commission had never 
before had the opportunity to exercise its powers.159 In other words, no 
situation had ever arisen in which the Commission found it necessary to 
exercise its competence and adopt measures pursuant to Article 57(2), 
Article 59, or Article 60 of the EC Treaty. Therefore, the incompatibility 
alleged by the Commission was “merely hypothetical until the Council 
adopt[ed] the relevant provisions.”160 The Commission argued that the 
Member States were required to eliminate even potential compatibilities 
                                                                                                             
 152. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 6; Sweden Proceedings, supra note 
148, ¶ 6. 
 153. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 57(2). Under Article 57(2), the European 
Council may adopt measures on the movement of capital to and from non-EU countries 
“which constitute a step back in Community law as regards the liberalisation of the 
movement of capital to or from third countries.”  
 154. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 59. Under Article 59, the Council may take 
safeguard measures restricting capital flows to non-EU countries in “exceptional circums-
tances” if it deems such measures to be “strictly necessary.” 
 155. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 60. Under Article 60, the Council may “take 
the necessary urgent measures on the movement of capital and on payments as regards 
the third countries concerned.” 
 156. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 11; Sweden Proceedings, supra note 
148, ¶ 11. 
 157. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 6; Sweden Proceedings, supra note 
148, ¶ 6. 
 158. See Potesta, supra note 19, at 241. 
 159. Id. at 238. 
 160. Id. at 241. 
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when Article 307 is read in conjunction with Article 10 of the EC Trea-
ty.161 Article 10 sets forth a duty of loyalty and cooperation, under which: 
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this 
Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Commu-
nity. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the at-
tainment of the objectives of this Treaty.162 
While the ECJ did not adopt the Commission’s reasoning, it nevertheless 
held that the Member States had breached their obligations under Article 
307 of the EC Treaty.163 
As was the case in Eastern Sugar, the implications of the court’s deci-
sions extend beyond the BITs concluded by Austria and Sweden, as other 
EU Member States are parties to hundreds of BITs with non-EU coun-
tries. In its judgments, the ECJ clarified that its holding does not apply 
only to Austrian and Swedish BITs entered into with non-EU countries, 
but to all Member States that are parties to BITs containing similar pro-
visions.164 In general, the judgments reflect a broad interpretation of Ar-
ticle 307, suggesting that Member States must eliminate even potential 
incompatibilities between the BITs and EC law.165 In this way, endless 
scenarios for incompatibility can be envisioned.166 Unless the Council 
takes it upon itself to bring infringement proceedings against Member 
States that are encroaching on EU law through their BITs, the individual 
Member States are unlikely to examine their BITs on their own accord, 
identify potential incompatibilities, and then work with the non-EU 
country to amend the treaty.167 
III. BITS AND THE EU LEGAL ORDER POST-LISBON  
On December 1, 2009, the Lisbon Treaty entered into effect.168 The 
treaty amends the current principal sources of law of the EU, namely the 
                                                                                                             
 161. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 11; Sweden Proceedings, supra note 
148, ¶ 11. 
 162. See EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 10. 
 163. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 45; Sweden Proceedings, supra note 
148, ¶ 45. 
 164. See Austria Proceedings, supra note 147, ¶ 43; Sweden Proceedings, supra note 
148, ¶ 43. 
 165. See Potesta, supra note 19, at 243. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. at 237. 
 168. See Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st Century, EUROPA.EU, 
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm (last visited June 1, 2010); see also Dan Bi-
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EC Treaty and the EU Treaty.169 After years of debate, the Lisbon Treaty 
extends EU competence to the fields of trade and services, trade related 
aspects of intellectual property, and, in a “major innovation, to foreign 
direct investment.”170 These fields are all brought within the ambit of the 
Common Commercial Policy (“CCP”), the section of the Lisbon Treaty 
which establishes the basis of the EU’s legal position in its international 
economic relations, as well as one of the few areas in which the EU re-
tains exclusive competence.171 This marks a significant departure from 
the EC Treaty prior to the Lisbon amendments, under which the CCP 
only extended to the field of external trade.172 In this way the Lisbon 
Treaty “reflects a new governance arrangement and legal order that was 
not contemplated by the current investment system.”173 
Because the Lisbon Treaty very recently entered into effect, it remains 
to be seen how its new provisions under the CCP will be interpreted and 
applied. However, the Lisbon Treaty certainly has the potential to present 
considerable implications for the relationship between the EU legal order 
and the system of BITs with respect to the contentious realm of FDI.174 
While neither the EC Treaty nor the EU Treaty contain provisions specif-
ically referencing FDI, Article 206 and Article 207(1) of the Lisbon 
Treaty unequivocally bring FDI under the auspice of the CCP.175 The 
                                                                                                             
lefsky & Stephen Castle, Way is Clear to Centralize Europe’s Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
4, 2009, at A6 (stating that on November 3, 2009, the Lisbon Treaty “cleared its last ma-
jor hurdle,” as the president of the Czech Republic was the last European leader to sign 
the treaty). 
 169. See Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st Century, supra note 168. 
 170. See Stephen Woolcock, The Potential Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European 
Union External Trade Policy, SWEDISH INST. FOR EUR. POL’Y ANALYSIS, June 2008, at 1. 
 171. See Bungenberg, supra note 28, at 124.  
 172. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 133. 
 173. See L. Yves Fortier, Chairman, Address at the British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law 50th Anniversary Series, Investment Protection and the Rule of 
Law: Change or Decline? (Mar. 17, 2009).  
 174. See Woolcock, supra note 170, at 4. 
 175. See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 25. The Lisbon Treaty inserts the new heading 
“External Action by the Union.” Under this heading, Title II sets forth the “Common 
Commercial Policy.” Article 131 of the EC Treaty, supra note 22, read: “By establishing 
a customs union between themselves Member States aim to contribute, in the common 
interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of re-
strictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers.” Under the Lisbon 
Treaty, this wording is replaced by the following: “By establishing a customs union in 
accordance with Articles 23 to 27, the Union shall contribute, in the common interest, the 
harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on in-
ternational trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other 
barriers.” Article 133(1) of the EC Treaty read: “The common commercial policy shall be 
based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclu-
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Lisbon Treaty adds the term “foreign direct investment” within the scope 
of coverage of the CCP, but the intent of this language is ambiguous, 
and, thus, it remains unclear whether these FDI provisions in effect cir-
cumscribe the existing domestic competence of the Member States.176 In 
other words, it is uncertain whether the Lisbon Treaty grants the EU ex-
clusive competence over liberalization, protection, and promotion of 
FDI,177 or only to the liberalization of FDI178 in general.179 At the same 
time, employing a strict textual reading, the language of the Lisbon Trea-
ty now grants the EU exclusive power over the field of FDI, and does not 
cite any exceptions.180 
IV. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE TRANSFER OF COMPETENCE OVER 
FDI AND SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The EU’s objective in bringing FDI under the auspice of the CCP is to 
improve efficiency in foreign investment negotiations, and to eliminate 
the complications that arise from a system of intertwined competences.181 
However, this aim will be thwarted if there is an expedited overhaul of 
the current legal structure for the protection of foreign investment. If the 
EU seeks to improve its competitive position in the global economy as an 
                                                                                                             
sion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberali-
zation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event 
of dumping or subsidies.” Under the Lisbon Treaty, this is replaced as follows: “The 
common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard 
to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in 
goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct 
investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy 
and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsi-
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and objectives of the Union’s external action.” (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Lis-
bon Treaty adds the following language: “For the negotiation and conclusion of agree-
ments in the field of trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, 
as well as foreign direct investment, the Council shall act unanimously where such 
agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of inter-
nal rules.” (emphasis added). 
 176. See Eilmansberger, supra note 20, at 394. 
 177. Significantly, the liberalization, promotion and protection of FDI are considered 
the three fundamental goals of BITs. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 68. 
 178. Investment liberalization generally refers to the creation of an investment climate 
in which foreign investors undertake investments that they judge to be in their interest 
rather than in the interest of the host country. See id.  at 78–79. 
 179. See Mola supra note 138, para. 3.2. 
 180. Bungenberg, supra note 28.  
 181. See supra Part II; see also Ceyssens, supra note 95, at 269 (“[T]he current proce-
dures involving both Member States and the EU in the conclusion and implementation of 
international agreements are excessively burdensome”). 
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economic superpower, it needs to maintain a transparent, stable system 
for the regulation of foreign investment.182 If foreign investors believe 
that the EU’s system does not provide adequate protection, they may 
choose to retract their investments. This will make it difficult for the EU 
to attract new foreign investors who will likely forego opportunities in 
the EU to avoid the problems associated with an unstable investment re-
gime. Furthermore, the BITs entered into by EU Member States are part 
of a dense international network of BITs, and a disruption of this system 
could be detrimental to the EU’s foreign relations. Therefore, in respond-
ing to the challenges that lie ahead, it is crucial that the EU make a gra-
dual, deliberate transition from a system in which Member States have 
the competence to conclude BITs, to a system in which the EU retains 
exclusive competence over FDI. While the transfer of competence over 
FDI from the individual EU Member States to the EU creates a number 
of problems, if these problems are adequately dealt with, then the 
changes to FDI embodied in the Lisbon Treaty will represent an im-
provement over the EU’s prior international investment regime. 
A. Will EU Member States Retain the Competence to Negotiate and Con-
clude BITs in the Future? 
Article 207 of the Lisbon Treaty does not define the scope of the EU’s 
authority over FDI, leaving the provision open to disparate interpreta-
tions.183 According to Dr. Stephen Woolcock, some Member States in-
terpret Article 207 to grant the EU exclusive competence over FDI only 
as it relates to investment liberalization.184 Under this narrow interpreta-
tion, the EU would have exclusive power to negotiate and conclude in-
ternational investment agreements providing for pre-establishment na-
tional treatment,185 but not to the protection of foreign investment once it 
has entered the country.186 Therefore, Member States would retain their 
competence to conclude BITs. Alternatively, some Member States, as 
                                                                                                             
 182. See Bungenberg, supra note 28, at 125 (“Economic growth, employment and 
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876 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:3 
well as the Commission, interpret Article 207 more broadly, so that FDI 
includes both investment liberalization and investment protection.187 Un-
der this broader interpretation, EU Member States would no longer be 
able to negotiate and conclude BITs on their own, as the substantive as-
pects of investment protection would fall exclusively under the compe-
tence of the EU.188 Because these two interpretations have such different 
implications for the future of the EU’s international investment policy, 
there is a need for legal certainty. 
The EU must approach this issue pragmatically. If the EU adopts the 
narrow interpretation of Article 207, then it will not achieve its objec-
tives in bringing FDI under the auspice of the CCP. This is because the 
EU would still need to deal with the incompatibility and inconsistency 
problems that arise from a system of shared competence.189 On the other 
hand, the EU’s adoption of the broader interpretation of Article 207 
would entail an immediate, disruptive overhaul of the legal infrastructure 
created by the BIT network. In order to avoid these problems, the EU 
should adopt the broader interpretation so that both the liberalization and 
the protection of FDI fall under the competence of the EU, but the EU 
should exercise its newfound competence gradually. 
While the Lisbon Treaty itself does not provide for any kind of transi-
tion period, this does not prevent the EU from establishing one. In 
Donckerwolcke v. Procureur de la Republique,190 the ECJ held that even 
though the EU has exclusive competence with regard to the CCP, dero-
gation is permitted where the EU specifically authorizes the Member 
States to act.191 Thus, the EU could authorize the Member States to con-
tinue to negotiate and conclude BITs, but could establish a definitive 
timeline so that eventually the Member States will no longer have this 
power. This approach will enable the EU to articulate its long-term ob-
jective by stating that it retains the exclusive authority over all aspects of 
FDI, but is temporarily deviating from this policy in order to ensure a 
smoother transition to a system of exclusive competence. This type of 
transition period will make the policy clear to non-EU countries, prepare 
EU Member States and foreign investors for what is to come, and avoid 
an immediate overhaul of a well-established system. By gradually phas-
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ing out BITs, the EU will have the opportunity to further develop its own 
foreign investment policy and conclude international investment treaties 
that provide foreign investors with adequate protection. 
Finally, the EU should also commence discussions on “portfolio in-
vestment,” which is not encompassed by the EU’s authority over FDI.192 
Many BITs provide for an expansive definition of “investment,” which 
includes “portfolio investment.”193 Therefore, by explicitly referring only 
to FDI in the CCP, the Lisbon Treaty leaves some types of foreign in-
vestment outside the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence. This will 
most likely permit individual Member States to continue to conclude 
BITs, albeit only in terms of the regulation of portfolio investment. 
While the Lisbon Treaty aims for a streamlined approach in the conclu-
sion of these types of agreements, the EU’s failure to conclude compre-
hensive agreements pertaining to foreign investment will certainly fru-
strate this objective by maintaining a fragmented system. Foreign inves-
tors will need to enter into investment agreements with the EU for the 
protection of FDI, and will separately need to enter into bilateral agree-
ments with the individual Member States in order to protect their portfo-
lio investments. 
B. What is the Legal Status of Existing BITs Concluded by EU Member 
States? 
Another problem arising from the transfer of competence over FDI 
from Member States to the EU is the unclear legal status of existing BITs 
between EU Member States and non-EU countries. Pursuant to Article 
307(2) of the EC Treaty, EU Member States “shall take all appropriate 
steps to eliminate the incompatibilities” between their treaty obligations 
with non-EU countries and their obligations under the EC Treaty.194 Ar-
ticle 351 of the Lisbon Treaty incorporates this exact language.195 There-
fore, EU Member States must ensure that incompatibilities stemming 
from their BIT obligations with non-EU countries conform to EU law 
now that the EU has been granted exclusive competence over FDI. If an 
expansive definition of FDI were adopted, then it would appear that in 
order to conform to Article 351, Member States must either terminate 
their BITs or dramatically amend their provisions, as they deal predomi-
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nantly with FDI. However, this is impractical given the number of BITs 
to which Member States are parties.196 
Furthermore, requiring EU Member States to terminate their BITs is 
contrary to customary international law.197 Under Article 27 of the 
VCLT, “a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justi-
fication for its failure to perform a treaty.”198 Under Article 42 of the 
VCLT, “the termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of 
a party, may take place only as a result of the application of the provi-
sions of the treaty or the present Convention.”199 Under Article 59 of the 
VCLT: 
[A] treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it con-
clude a later treaty relating to the same subject matter and . . . it appears 
from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended 
that the matter should be governed by that treaty . . . or the provisions 
of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one 
that the two parties are not capable of being applied at the same time.200 
Based on these VCLT provisions, Member States cannot be legally 
forced to terminate their BITs. 
The majority of BITs provide that the agreement shall remain in force 
for a period of ten years, and at the end of each ten-year period either 
party may choose to terminate the BIT by providing notice to the other 
party.201 Furthermore, BITs often provide that if a party terminates a BIT 
according to its terms, the investments covered by its provisions will 
continue to be protected under the agreement for a specified number of 
years.202 Forcing EU Member States to immediately terminate their BITs 
would be at odds with Article 42 of the VCLT because termination must 
be governed by the termination terms contained within each individual 
BIT. Furthermore, Article 59 is inapplicable because the non-EU Mem-
ber States that are parties to the BITs with EU Member States are not 
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also parties to the Lisbon Treaty. While the Lisbon Treaty arguably cov-
ers the same subject matter, the Lisbon Treaty is not binding on these 
countries and, therefore, cannot supersede existing BITs. 
Because it would be both impractical and contrary to international law 
to call for the immediate termination of extra-EU BITs, an interim sys-
tem needs to be established in order to facilitate a gradual transition to 
exclusive EU competence over FDI. This could be accomplished by al-
lowing the BITs to terminate according to their own terms. At the end of 
the ten-year periods, the EU Member States could give notice to the oth-
er party that they intend to terminate the respective treaty. As these BITs 
expire, they can then be replaced by agreements negotiated and con-
cluded by the EU. At the same time, Member States must ensure, as is 
required by Article 307 of the EC Treaty and now Article 351 of the Lis-
bon Treaty, that their BITs comply with all other provisions of EU 
law.203 If not, these EU Member States should renegotiate and amend 
these treaties.204 This approach is in the best interest of the EU because it 
will reduce the likelihood that foreign investors withdraw their invest-
ments in EU countries out of the concern that these investments are not 
protected under an investment treaty. Furthermore, EU Member States 
will be complying with customary international law under the VCLT, 
and therefore will not be destroying their legitimacy and harming their 
relations with foreign countries. 
C. Is the EU Capable of Concluding International Investment Agree-
ments Comparable to BITs? 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty entering into force, the EU negotiated trea-
ties addressing investment-related issues, but none which dealt exclu-
sively and comprehensively with the liberalization and protection of a 
broad range of investments.205 These EU treaties differ significantly from 
BITs which provide for both substantive and procedural protections of 
foreign investment.206 Because the EU is not accustomed to negotiating 
and concluding BITs, it could take the transition period proposed in the 
previous two sections of this Note to further develop its investment poli-
cy platform. It could create a “Model International Investment Agree-
ment” that contains provisions comparable to those contained in BITs. 
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This model agreement should provide for the main substantive protec-
tions afforded under BITs, including national treatment, most favored 
nation, compensation for expropriation, and rights to transfer capital and 
returns.207 In particular, the EU should develop a procedural mechanism 
for the settlement of investment disputes that will likely arise under its 
newly negotiated and concluded agreements.208 By taking these steps, the 
EU will be able to maintain a stable regime for the regulation of foreign 
investment. If not, foreign countries will be reluctant to enter into in-
vestment agreements with the EU that do not provide for conditions as 
favorable as those provided under BITs. 
The EU does not currently have an international dispute settlement re-
gime comparable to the ad hoc system prescribed in BITs.209 Therefore, 
as the situation stands, foreign investors would need to bring their in-
vestment dispute claims against the EU before the ECJ.210 According to 
Peter Ondrusek, a consultant for the United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organization: 
[T]here are not necessarily any real obstacles in principle for the EC to 
become a party to an international investment-dispute arbitration sys-
tem. However, there are some obstacles on the part of the current inter-
national investor-State arbitration system to be able to accommodate re-
liably the EC.211 
The main forum chosen for dispute settlement under BITs is the Inter-
national Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).212 How-
ever, the EU is not a party to the ISCID.213 Under Article 67 of the 
ICSID Convention, the convention is open for signature on behalf of 
States that are members of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, as well as States that are parties to the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice and have been invited to sign the convention by 
the Administrative Council of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes.214 While the EU is not a state, it should neverthe-
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less attempt to become a party to an impartial investment dispute fo-
rum.215 This way, as BITs concluded by EU Member States are gradually 
phased out, foreign investors will still have access to the procedural me-
chanisms that make BITs such attractive agreements. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has explored the nature of the relationship between BITs 
concluded by EU Member States and the EU legal order, and the poten-
tial impact on this interface now that the Lisbon Treaty has entered into 
force. It remains to be seen how the challenges of the EU’s international 
investment system will be resolved in the future. Prior to the passage of 
the Lisbon Treaty, a system of shared competence in the realm of foreign 
investment led to incompatibility and overlap issues that made it difficult 
for the EU to act as a united front. At the same time, this BIT network 
has been in place for over five decades and provides benefits to countries 
seeking to attract foreign investors, as well as to foreign investors who 
seek protection against the inherent risks associated with their invest-
ments. While the Lisbon Treaty brings FDI under the auspice of the 
Common Commercial Policy, the simple addition of the term “foreign 
direct investment” does not indicate how the EU’s exclusive competence 
over FDI will be interpreted and applied, and whether or not it is in-
tended to completely displace the current BIT network. 
Because of the need for legal certainty, the EU’s current system of 
BITs should remain intact in the short term, as it provides for investment 
protection and arbitral dispute mechanisms of which there are no viable 
equivalents under the Lisbon Treaty. While the EU’s exclusive compe-
tence over FDI is a logical step in the movement toward a more stream-
lined, comprehensive multilateral EU trade and investment system, an 
expedited overhaul of the current legal structure would foster uncertainty 
and be detrimental to the EU’s continued ability to attract FDI and man-
age foreign-investor expectations. It would be imprudent to immediately 
do away with the standing BIT system until the EU is able to develop a 
stable and transparent international investment framework. Therefore, 
the EU should implement a transition period in which it can gradually 
adapt to its new, exclusive authority to negotiate and conclude interna-
tional investment treaties. Dr. Stephen Woolcock states, “The inclusion 
of FDI in EU competence is an important step towards the creation of a 
comprehensive EU approach to trade and investment that reflects the 
nature of the international economy in which trade and investment are 
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inextricably linked.”216 The EU must take gradual and deliberate action 
in order to improve its international investment regime. 
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